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Abstract: 
Parliamentary debate is one major outlet for Members of Parliament (MPs), who spend lots of 
time preparing for and participating in such discussions. In this paper, we investigate in how 
far the focus MPs choose in their speeches varies as the economic, partisan and electoral 
context changes. We choose to study the dynamics nature of speech content in the UK House 
of Commons, as British MPs enjoy broad discretion regarding the content of their speeches. 
This paper analyses the constituency, national or partisan focus of all speeches held in the 
House of Commons between January 1996 and September 2004. We find that government 
and opposition MPs react differently to contextual changes. Government MPs generally have 
a higher district focus, which is increased further when the local economy declines and when 
the governing party becomes more popular.  
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1. Introduction 
Electoral systems with single-member districts, such as in the United Kingdom, undeniably 
provide a geographical link between constituents and members of parliament (MPs). This 
“electoral connection” provides an important stimulus for constituency service of incumbent 
MPs. By engaging in representational activities with a focus on their parliamentary 
constituency in parliament, MPs can hope to increase their electoral prospects in their 
constituency at the next election (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995; 
Farell and Scully 2007). Political institutions, however, can curb such personal incentives 
when the importance of political parties trumps personal electoral considerations. In 
parliamentary system where governments rely on the support of a parliamentary majority, 
party unity is high and the opportunities for dissenting MP behavior are limited (Sieberer 
2006; Carey 2007).  
We investigate the parliamentary activity that provides MPs with the best opportunity 
to modify their representational focus: parliamentary debate. We focus on the United 
Kingdom as system that provides opposing incentives for MP behavior. While the 
geographical link between legislators and their electorate provides incentives for constituency 
representation, strong government control of the parliamentary agenda encourages 
confrontational partisan politics. Parliamentary debate in the UK has a particular set of 
features that allow a dynamic study of representation. First, MPs can deliver a parliamentary 
speech by catching the Speaker’s eye without prior partisan approval, as opposed to systems 
where parties regulate speaking time (Proksch and Slapin 2012). Second, parliamentary 
speeches are an inexpensive and flexible outlet for MPs to emphasize constituency-oriented or 
partisan interests. Finally, MPs can change their rhetoric during the course of the legislative 
term due to the relatively high number of speeches per MP compared to other individual MP 
activities such as early day motions (Kellerman 2012) or private member bills (Bowler 2010). 
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 We argue that British MPs balance constituency and partisan rhetoric in speeches as a 
function of changing economic conditions in their constituencies, changes in party popularity, 
and electoral proximity. We furthermore confirm existing evidence on the influence of 
political institutions and intra-party politics on debate participation (Proksch and Slapin 2012, 
2013). One of the most important results of our analysis is the effect of changing economic 
conditions in parliamentary constituencies. Our data analysis of UK parliamentary speeches 
between 1996 and 2004 shows that government MPs increase their rhetorical district focus 
when unemployment in their parliamentary constituencies increases, while opposition MPs 
persistently engage in partisan rhetoric. Furthermore, as the government’s popularity 
compared to the major competitor rises, government MPs increase their district focus while 
opposition MPs increasingly focus on the nation or party level. This suggests that opposition 
MPs seek to close this popularity gap by attacking the government, whereas government MPs 
attempt to provide a stronger voice for their constituents during those times. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
British MPs face few constraints when delivering parliamentary speeches. To participate in a 
debate or at question time, MPs rise from their seats to catch the Speaker’s eye and obtain his 
attention. Even though MPs may contact the Speaker ahead of a particular debate to indicate 
their desire to be called, the Speaker may honor such requests but does not need to follow 
them, in particular in popular debates (Sandford 2012). Moreover, parliamentary debate in the 
UK is characterized by frequent interventions and spontaneity, as members are not allowed to 
read a prepared speech (ibid.). Scholars have emphasized three aspects of parliamentary 
debate: as an opportunity for representing constituency interests, as a central arena to defend 
or attack government proposals, and as an activity characterized by an institutional selection 
process. We discuss each of these aspects and then formulate hypotheses with regard to the 
dynamics of speech-making in the House of Commons. 
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2.1. Parliamentary Speech as Constituency Representation 
Despite the dominant role of parties in British elections (Carey and Shugart 1995) and a 
government-controlled legislative agenda (Lijphart 1999; Tsebelis 2002), there is ample 
evidence, both observational and survey-based, that British MPs do consider their constituents 
in their parliamentary activities (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina 1987; Norton 1994; Norris 1997; 
Carey 2007; Farrell and Scully 2007), leading some to speak of the “puzzle of constituency 
service” (Norris 1997). In other words, personal vote seeking incentives appear to influence 
MP activities in single-member electoral districts despite the importance of parties’ “brand 
names” during elections. As they seek re-election, MPs build a personal reputation, and the 
level of interaction with constituents is an important component of their behaviour. In his 
comparative study of party discipline in Westminster systems, Kam (2009) stresses how 
important it is for MPs to consider the preferences of their constituents to enhance their name 
recognition.  
Studying MPs’ stated constituency focus in single-member districts in Westminster 
systems, Heitshusen, Young, and Wood (2005) show that MPs with unsafe seats are more 
likely to rank their constituency as their primary focus. While this provides an indication of 
the possible variation of district orientation among MPs, focusing on MPs’ characteristics 
alone is insufficient to explain variation over an entire parliamentary term. Elite surveys of 
MPs or candidates, moreover, are insufficient to study representational activities due to their 
snapshot view and low response rates. Moreover, elite survey responses on constituency focus 
are likely to suffer from a social desirability bias, as MPs have an incentive to overstate their 
constituency roles. 
An increasing number of scholars therefore relies on parliamentary speech to measure 
constituency focus. For example, Martin (2011) codes parliamentary questions in the Irish 
Dáil between 1997 and 2002 to measure a local or national focus of MPs’ question activity. 
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Saalfeld (2011) codes parliamentary questions in the UK House of Commons to show that 
MPs from minority groups are responsive to minority-related concerns, but that non-minority 
MPs also respond to the sociodemographic composition of their constituency. For Canada, 
Soroka, Penner and Blidook (2009) show that the number of oral questions increases as seat 
safety decreases. In their words, “MPs participate more when they face more competition in 
the next election” (ibid., p.580). They furthermore show that having a military base in a 
constituency increases questions on defense policy, and ideological rightward shifts of 
constituency preferences increase MPs’ number of tax/debt related questions. Moreover, they 
find that MPs representing constituencies with a high overall unemployment rate are more 
likely to ask welfare-related questions. In short, parliamentary speech may provide ample 
information on the constituency focus of MPs. MPs may use this tool to be particularly 
responsive to changing constituent concerns.  
 
2.2. Parliamentary Speech as Government-Opposition Debate 
Despite an electoral system with single-member districts that create electoral connections 
between MPs and constituents, parties in the UK House of Commons act in a highly cohesive 
manner when voting on bills due to strong government agenda control (Lijphart 1999, 
Tsebelis 2002, Kam 2009). Most votes in the House of Commons are whipped, meaning that 
party leaders issue instructions on how backbenchers should vote and party whips monitor 
whether party MPs actually behave accordingly. Using roll-call data for the 1990s, Sieberer 
(2006) estimates the average party unity index in the UK for the two main parties to be 99.3 
(out of 100), meaning parties act almost always as a unitary actor. Similarly, Benedetto and 
Hix (2007) find that an average Labour MP rebelled, i.e. voted against the majority position 
of the party, on 1.3 percent of votes between 2001 and 2005. Tracing individual backbencher 
dissent between 1945 and 2005, Kam (2009) shows that while the percentage of MPs 
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dissenting at least once has increased over time, the percentage of MPs voting against the 
party whip when dissenting divisions occur remains relatively low.  
Due to the frequency of single-party governments in the UK, relatively infrequent party 
rebellion, and a legislative process dominated by the executive, voters may consider a vote for 
a candidate as a choice for a party instead of for an individual politician representing a 
constituency. Even if infrequent, party rebellion can have electoral rewards. Kam (2009) 
shows that name recognition can increase as a result of rebellion in the UK and Vivyan and 
Wagner (2012) demonstrate that MP party rebellion can be an electorally successful strategy, 
in particular if a constituent evaluates the party leadership negatively. They estimated a 
moderately rebellious Labour MP between 2001 and 2005 to receive a constituency vote 
share about 1.5 percentage points higher than a loyal Labour MP.  
Thus, while party rebellion is a prominent phenomenon, it occurs infrequently and for 
the most part MPs’ voting behavior follows the party line. We would therefore expect that 
MPs also act as faithful party members during large portions of parliamentary debates, which 
provide an opportunity for opposition MPs to attack the government and for government MPs 
to defend their policies. 
 
2.3. Parliamentary Speech as a Selection Process 
The previous account of parliamentary speech suggests a tremendous potential for the study 
of political representation. Yet, it is important to consider that not all MPs actually participate 
in debates. Recently, Proksch and Slapin (2012, 2013) have proposed a model of the 
institutional foundations of legislative speech that embeds the decision to speak on the floor 
of parliament into a strategic intra-party context defined by the electoral environment. In this 
model, MP participation in parliamentary debates is considered a selection process: not all 
MPs want to (or are allowed to) participate in any given debate on a bill. In electoral 
environments where the party label is important for parties’ electoral fortunes, as in 
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proportional representation systems, party leaders will try to control the party message on the 
floor of parliament. This in turn means that MPs who are ideologically closer to the party 
leadership should be more likely to participate in debates and defend the party line rather than 
highlight a dissenting opinion from the party position. Conversely, in systems with a stronger 
local electoral connection, such as in the British first-past-the-post system, party leaders will 
allow their MPs more liberties to voice their district concerns, even if it is at the cost of 
diluting the party label. Thus, individual backbenchers have the opportunity in parliament to 
speak without strong party control. For the UK, they show that backbenchers are more likely 
to participate in debates than party leaders and that government MPs are also more active than 
opposition MPs. Any content analysis of parliamentary speech, therefore, needs to take into 
account the selection process that excludes (or provides little information for) a particular set 
of MPs.  
 
2.4. Our Approach 
We model MPs focus in parliamentary speeches as a balance between two competing interests. 
On the one hand, MPs can emphasize constituency (or district) concerns. On the other hand, 
MPs can focus on attacking the opposing isle and on national, rather than local, politics. This 
trade-off exists as the overall time at their disposal is limited. In other words, in order to 
determine an MP’s responsiveness to local issues, it is not sufficient to look at such issues 
alone. Instead, it is the relative emphasis an MP chooses to put on the district in contrast to 
partisan and national issues, and we expect several time-varying variables to influence the 
focus an MP chooses during the parliamentary term. We consider the economic, electoral, and 
partisan context for MPs’ speech content.  
Concerning the economic context, the state of the British economy as a whole cannot 
explain variation across MPs and over time. Instead, we consider the economic conditions in 
each parliamentary constituency. Accordingly, if the economic situation in the constituency 
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worsens, we expect an MP to raise awareness for this problem by emphasizing the electoral 
district in parliamentary debates. This yields dynamic responsiveness in parliamentary 
speeches, as MPs will adjust their communicated message according to changing local 
economic conditions. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (local economy): MPs’ district focus in parliamentary speeches 
increases (and party focus decreases) as unemployment in the parliamentary 
constituency increases. 
  
Several scholars have noted that electoral insecurity is an important consideration for British 
MPs’ parliamentary activities, “spurring MPs to devote more time to constituency service” 
(Kam 2009, p. 111). We would therefore expect that personal vote seeking through the 
expression of local concerns is particularly important when the re-election of the MP is 
uncertain (Benedetto and Hix 2007; Heitshusen et al. 2005; Bowler 2010). 
 
Hypothesis 2 (seat safety): MPs’ district focus in parliamentary speeches decreases 
(and party focus increases) as seat safety increases. 
 
Seat safety is also related to historic voting patterns of a parliamentary constituency. If an MP 
successfully challenged an incumbent MP from another party in a constituency, this may 
create pressure for the MP to represent local concerns in parliamentary speeches in the 
subsequent parliamentary term. 
 
Hypothesis 3 (constituency turnover): MPs who previously conquered a 
constituency from an incumbent MP from a different party express a higher district 
focus in their parliamentary speeches. 
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The responsiveness of MPs to district concerns should be higher as general elections approach 
compared to any other time during the parliamentary term. MPs can thus be expected to use 
the time of heightened attention around elections to enhance their image as responsive 
representatives by focusing on local issues in parliamentary speeches. 
 
Hypothesis 4 (electoral proximity): The closer the next election, the higher the 
district focus. 
 
Apart from these electoral and economic considerations, we also consider the partisan 
dimension of parliamentary debate. After all, parliamentary debates in the House of 
Commons are confrontational with government members facing opposition MPs. At the 
outset, one would not expect differences in the balance of district and party focus between 
government and opposition MPs. However, considering that government members set the 
legislative agenda, one would indeed expect that opposition MPs use parliamentary speeches 
as an opportunity to criticize government policy more generally. Government MPs, on the 
contrary, can afford to focus more on district issues. This intuition has been confirmed by 
Martin (2011) whose study of question activity in the Irish Dáil finds that government MPs 
have a higher district focus in their parliamentary question than opposition MPs. Furthermore, 
he also finds that opposition MPs ask more questions related to foreign policy and thus the 
national level than government backbenchers do (Martin, 2013). He interprets this as 
opposition MPs fulfilling their role by holding the government accountable for their policies 
(ibid. p. 124). 
 
Hypothesis 5 (government): MPs of the governing party have a higher district focus 
(lower party focus) than opposition MPs. 
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Regardless of their membership in a governing or opposition party, MPs with leadership roles 
should focus more on party and national politics than on local politics in their speeches. 
Previous studies have shown that constituency service efforts decline with a high 
parliamentary rank (Kam, 2009), ministers are more loyal MPs (Benedetto and Hix 2007), 
and constituency is less important to MPs as portfolio responsibilities increase (Heitshusen et 
al. 2005). 
 
Hypothesis 6 (party leader): Party leaders have a higher party/national focus than 
backbenchers. 
 
The national popularity of government may decrease during the course of a parliamentary 
term, providing an indicator for governing MPs that their re-election, even if not specific to 
their electoral district, may be endangered. We therefore expect that governing MPs will 
increase their district focus if the national popularity of their party decreases relative to the 
opposition. 
 
Hypothesis 7 (government party popularity): Decreasing national popularity of the 
government increases the district focus of governing MPs and increases the 
party/national focus of opposition MPs. 
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3. Data and Method 
We examine parliamentary speeches in the UK House of Commons between 1996 and 2004. 
Data on unemployment rates in parliamentary constituencies only cover the period since 1996, 
therefore limiting our analysis for the time being to two full terms of the Labour government 
and the final one and a half years of the Conservative government. Our unit of analysis are 
monthly speeches per MP. Thus, we aggregate all individual speeches of each MP delivered 
in each month prior to calculating our quantity of interest (district versus party/national focus). 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of MP-months in our dataset with at least one speech. The plot 
shows that most MPs are highly active. During this time period, an average MP gave at least 
one speech per month in more than half of the months. Only 1.5 percent of MPs are 
completely inactive. In contrast, 25 percent of MPs give at least one speech in more than 90 
percent of MP-months, and 5 percent of MPs give at least one speech in all months. 
 
Figure 1. Parliamentary Speech Activity by MP-Month in the UK, 1996-2004 
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We apply an automated content analysis to measure the expressed balance on district and 
party/national issues. This is a challenging task because of the various possibilities available 
to MPs for expressing local concerns or partisan policy. We therefore first identify keywords 
that are indicative of a constituency or district focus and those indicative of a party or national 
focus of the speech. These are shown in Error! Reference source not found.. We use 
references to the constituency and local references as district keywords. For example, when 
an MP refers to “my constituents”, “my constituency”, or “where I live”. These expressions 
are generic, but capture the intention to highlight the MP’s role as the representative of his 
constituency. This can be seen for example in the following statement, made by John 
McDonnell in the debate on the Iraq war: 
 
I want to put my views on record for my constituents and the community 
where I live and which I work hard to represent so that they know and 
understand what I do today. 
- John McDonnell on March 18, 2003 
 
MPs can also focus on national and partisan issues in their speeches. One possibility is to 
refer back to the general debate in their contribution. For doing so, there are several standing 
expressions in the British House of Commons to refer to other MPs. As the speeches are 
formally addressed to the Speaker of the House, the Members of Parliament refer to each 
other in the third person. Thus, parliamentary practice dictates that they use the expressions 
“honorable Friend”, which is generally reserved for references to members of the same party, 
or the general “honorable Member”, “honorable Gentleman”, or “honorable Lady”. Another 
possibility to refer to the party/national level is to stress the role of the major parties, either 
directly (“Labour Party” and “Conservative Party”) or in their function as government and 
opposition (e.g. “the Prime Minister”, “the Minister”, “the Government”, “the Opposition”). 
Lastly, MPs can also choose to refer to the general national interest using expressions such as 
“national”, “British”, or “this nation”. 
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Table 1. Keywords Used for Parliamentary Speech Analysis 
 
District Focus Party/National Focus 
• My constituen* • Hon Friend • The Prime Minister 
• My surgery • Hon Member • The Minister 
• Where I was born • Hon Gentleman • Ministers 
• Where I live • Hon Gentlemen • The Government 
• Where I grew up • Hon Lady • The Opposition 
• Local • Hon and learned member • The previous Government 
 • Labour Party • Home Secretary 
 • Conservative Party • Secretary of State 
  • National  
  • British 
  • Britain 
  • This country 
  • This nation 
 
Two examples can illustrate speeches with a party/national focus. The first clearly expresses 
partisan division on policy: 
 
At this moment, the Government—and the right hon. Gentleman as their 
faithful ally—are benefiting from the strength of the economy that they 
inherited from the previous Government and the decisions that that 
Government took, many of which were deeply unpopular. Those decisions 
were opposed mostly, but not entirely, by the right hon. Gentleman and 
almost entirely by the Labour party. However, their legacy is an economic 
climate unlike that inherited from any previous Government. The right 
hon. Gentleman would do well to reflect on that point. 
- John Major on June 2, 1998. 
 
The second speech refers more to a general British interest, rather than partisan 
conflict, but is also an example of a party/national rather than a district focus: 
The hon. Gentleman should be aware that the Secretary of State is at the 
Environment Council, and has written to the Opposition to tell them that 
she is there looking after British interests. [Interruption.] The hon. 
Gentleman does not care about British interests, but we do, and the 
Secretary of State does. 
- Alun Michael on October 17, 2002. 
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To generate our measure of the balance between a district and a party-national speech focus, 
we count the number of keywords used by each MP in each month between January 1996 and 
September 2004 using the electronic Historic Hansard database.1 To capture the balance, one 
possibility is to subtract the number of district keywords per month-MP from the number of 
party-national keywords. However, an important consideration speaks against this procedure. 
It would attribute each keyword count in the two categories the same marginal effect. Lowe et 
al. (2011) have argued that what matters for expressing a position with categories is not so 
much the absolute difference between counts, but rather the ratio between them. This means 
that additional keywords in each category will have decreasing marginal effects. We 
consequently implement Lowe et al.’s empirical logit scale for our two categories.  
 
SpeechFocus = log District  + .5
PartyNational  + .5 
 
The benefit is that we can consider the balance between the two categories and that additional 
counts of either category have diminishing marginal effects on speech focus measure. We also 
implement Lowe et al.’s suggestion to add 0.5 to all counts to make the measure more robust 
to small category counts. Figure 2 shows the distribution of our speech focus measure. The 
mean value for both government and opposition MPs is negative, meaning that MPs used on 
average relatively more keywords referring to party/national politics than those referring to 
local constituency politics. We note that our keyword-based approach implies that changes to 
the dictionary entries, i.e. adding or removing keywords, may result in new absolute values of 
the individual MP’s balance between party/national and district politics. Therefore, we refrain 
from interpreting a zero value on this scale as a substantively balanced expression of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The website can be access at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/. The online archive does not extend beyond 
2004. We plan to add data for 2005-2010 from the official House of Commons website. 
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party/national and district politics in absence of an external anchor (see Lowe et al. 2011, 
p.131).  
 
Figure 2. District versus Party-National Focus  
in UK House of Commons Speeches (1996-2004) 
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Figure 3. Average District versus Party-National Focus  
in UK House of Commons Speeches over Time (1996-2004) 
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1997 and the Labour government and the Conservative party after that). As a measure, we 
calculate the government popularity gap by subtracting the percentage share of respondents 
intending to vote for the major contestant from the share of those intending to vote for the 
governing party. A positive value thus indicates that more respondents intend to vote for 
governing than for the opposition Party. 
We include several additional dummies: the first one indicates whether the MP belongs 
to a party in government or opposition, the second whether an MP holds a leader position 
(party whip, Parliamentary Under Secretary, Minister of State or a Member of the (Shadow) 
Cabinet) – both these variables are from Proksch and Slapin (2013) –, and a third whether the 
MP conquered a constituency from an MP from a different party. An overview of the 
variables is shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Overview of variables 
Variable Operationalization Variation Min Mean Max 
Speech Focus Logit transformed relation between district 
keyword counts and party/national 
keyword counts. A positive value indicates 
a higher district focus. 
MP per month -5.87 -1.19 2.12 
Unemployment 
Rate Change 
Change in the claimant count rate in one 
month compared to the average of the 
preceding three months 
Constituency 
per month 
-3.17 -0.07 1.60 
Government MP Whether that MP’s party is in government 
(1) or not (0) 
Party per 
legislative 
term 
0 0.44 1 
Party Leader Whether the MP is a whip, a parliamentary 
under secretary, a minister of state or a 
member of the (shadow) cabinet 
MP per month 0 0.17 1 
Seat Safety Difference between the vote share 
received by the MP and that of the runner-
up  
MP per 
election 
0 22.07 74.36 
Electoral 
Proximity 
Whether the next election is to be held 
within a year of the speech (1) or not (0)  
Month 0 0.26 1 
Government 
Popularity Gap 
Difference in the vote intention for the 
governing party and the major contestant 
Party per 
month 
-36 13.20 34 
Constituency 
Turnover 
Whether the constituency was represented 
by an MP of another party in the previous 
term (1) or not (0) 
Constituency 
per election 
0 0.15 1 
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We analyze the data as follows. We first apply a standard OLS model predicting the 
speech focus for those MP-months with positive speech counts, since our dependent variable 
is undefined for those months in which the MP did not deliver any speech. To control for 
unobserved heterogeneity at the MP-level, we additionally run a mixed model with MP-term 
specific random intercepts (i.e. each MP has a different random intercept estimate for each 
parliamentary term she is a House of Commons member) for the same set of observations.  
In their study of party politics and parliamentary debates, Proksch and Slapin (2012, 
2013) have noted that the decision to speak can be predicted systematically. This means that 
the data can be perceived as one of two problems. The first is a (Heckman) selection process 
where speech focus is conditional on speech participation. The second is a missing data 
problem where the patterns of missingness, i.e. unobserved speech focus values for months 
where MPs did not deliver a speech, can be predicted from the observed data matrix. In this 
sense, the analysis can include the non-observed cases by imputing the patterns using the 
variables in the dataset. Proksch and Slapin (2012, 2013), for instance, have shown that 
speech participation can be explained by party leader status and government status in addition 
to ideological disagreement between party leaders and backbenchers. We therefore perform 
multiple imputation to generate complete datasets and re-estimate the OLS and mixed effects 
models. 
 
4. Results 
Table 3 presents the estimation results for the OLS model (1), mixed effects model (2), OLS 
model using the imputed dataset (3), and the mixed effects model using the imputed dataset 
(4). Notably, the direction of all effects appears robust across all specifications, but there are 
important differences. We first discuss the results of the first model. To ease interpretation, 
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we simulate the marginal effects of the main independent variables and their interactions have 
based on Model 1 and plot these in Figures 4 through 6.  
 
Table 3. Explaining Monthly Parliamentary Speech Focus in the UK, 1996-2004 
(DV: district versus party/national focus) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS Multilevel OLS 
Imputation 
Multilevel 
Imputation 
(Intercept) -1.620 -1.675 −1.643 −1.678 
 (0.020) (0.040) (0.015) (0.026) 
Unemployment Rate Change -0.005 -0.069 0.012 −0.054 
 (0.046) (0.041) (0.052) (0.031) 
Government MP 0.309 0.312 0.303 0.287 
 (0.025) (0.049) (0.021) (0.026) 
Party Leader -0.634 -0.493 −0.584 −0.516 
 (0.016) (0.026) (0.020) (0.022) 
Seat Safety -0.002 0.000 −0.001 −0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Electoral Proximity 0.030 0.086 0.056 0.109 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) 
Government Popularity Gap -0.003 -0.001 −0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Constituency Turnover 0.138 0.075 0.160     0.105 
 (0.018) (0.041) (0.017) (0.034) 
Unemployment x Government MP 0.099 0.112 0.063 0.096 
 (0.059) (0.053) (0.061) (0.046) 
Seat Safety x Government MP -0.004 -0.003 −0.005 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gov Popularity Gap x Government MP 0.005 0.002 0.003 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ranef – MP  0.309  0.198 
  (0.556)  (0.445) 
Ranef – Residual   0.842  0.944 
  (0.917)  (0.972) 
R−squared 0.074    
adj. R-squared 0.073    
Log-likelihood  -41,253  −60,883 
Observations (MP-Months) 29,927 29,927 42,850 42,850 
Groups (MPs)  1,252  1,273 
 
Note: Higher values in the DV mean more district focus of monthly MP speech. Group refers to MPs per 
parliamentary term. 
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Figure 4. Effect of Unemployment Rate Changes in Parliamentary Constituencies  
on MPs' Parliamentary Speech Focus 
 
 
Figure 4 shows that there is an interaction effect between the state of the local economy and 
party status on the speech focus of the MP. Our expectation, as formulated in Hypothesis 1, 
was that MPs stress the local level as the unemployment rate in the constituency increases. 
This expectation is confirmed for government MPs. However, the state of the local economy 
does not affect the speech focus of MPs whose party is in opposition. Only when the claimant 
counts decrease noticeably, i.e. the constituency is doing better compare to the previous three-
month average, do government and opposition MPs choose an indistinguishable speech focus. 
Opposition MPs retain their higher focus on party-national issues. To substantiate our 
quantitative finding, we present two examples to illustrate the point. Both are taken from 
legislative debates in December 1997, thus shortly after the electoral victory of the Labour 
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Party in May. Mr Redwood, the Conservative member for Wokingham, a constituency with a 
low but rising unemployment rate, used partisan language to discuss economic policy:  
 
Labour is bad for business. So far, the Government have overtaxed and 
over-regulated business. They now threaten it with much damaging 
legislation. The Department of Trade and Industry, under the President of 
the Board of Trade, meddles, muddles and prevaricates on every issue. (...) 
The glorious summer of Conservative economic success that Labour 
inherited is quickly being made winter by the Government. 
- MP Redwood in December 1997 
 
The MP emphasized that in his view it is clearly the Government led by the Labour 
party that is responsible for the downturn. Shorty after the election, he stressed how the 
economic situation had been better under the Conservative government. In contrast, the 
Labour MP Atherton representing Falmouth and Camborne, a constituency that has a 
considerably higher unemployment rate than Wokingham, emphasized local concerns:  
 
I represent probably the lowest-paid constituency in the country. It would 
be fair to say that the people of Falmouth and Camborne are crying out for a 
national minimum wage. So important is the issue that I want to describe 
some of the problems that my constituents face. 
  - MP Atherton in December 1997 
 
She continued describing these problems, referring to the party when describing how 
the Labour policies will solve them. Still, she clearly put more emphasis on the district level 
in her speech.  
When it comes to the effect of the leadership status, MPs holding a leader position put 
more emphasis on the party-national level, which is in line with Hypothesis 6. Given model 1, 
ceteris paribus, a leader is expected to have a speech focus value of -2.14 (95% CI: -2.17,-
2.11) and a backbencher a value of -1.50 (95% CI: -1.52,-1.49), a substantially large 
difference given the speech focus scale.  
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Figure 5. Effect of Seat Safety on MPs' Parliamentary Speech Focus 
	  
 
Put differently, while an average backbencher has a speech value in the 53rd percentile of the 
scale, an average party leader is in the 31st percentile. 
As the seat safety of MPs increases, the district focus decreases. The data thus support 
the second hypothesis. There is a significant interaction effect between the seat safety and 
government status (see Figure 5). For opposition MPs, the seat safety has no effect on the 
speech focus, which is at a partisan level throughout, whereas government MPs appear more 
responsive to the future electoral contest in their parliamentary constituency.  
 
 
 
−2.0
−1.8
−1.6
−1.4
−1.2
−1.0
Seat Safety (Margin of Victory)
Pa
rlia
m
en
ta
ry
 S
pe
ec
h 
Fo
cu
s
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
Pa
rty
−N
at
ion
al
Fo
cu
s
Di
str
ict
Fo
cu
s
Opposition MP
Government MP
 	   23 
Figure 6. Effect of Monthly Government Popularity Gap  
on MPs' Parliamentary Speech Focus 
 
 
Additionally, the government popularity gap is included as a predictor for MPs’ 
parliamentary speech focus. During the whole period there were more respondents intending 
to vote for the Labour Party in the next election than there were respondents intending to vote 
for the Conservative Party – regardless of the parties’ government status. As can be seen in 
Figure 6, an increasing popularity of the government party as compared to the major 
contestant affects government and opposition MPs differently. While government MPs further 
increase their district focus as government popularity rises, opposition MPs slightly increase 
their focus on party/ national issues.  
Lastly, Hypotheses 3 and 4 stated that the district focus should increase if the 
constituency has been ‘conquered’ from another party in the last election and if the next 
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general election approaches, respectively. Both of these variables indeed significantly 
increase the MPs’ district focus. 
 
4.1. Parliamentary Speech as a Missing Data Problem 
The results discussed up until now are based on cases when MPs held at least one speech per 
month, thus excluding the months in which no speeches were delivered. To impute the speech 
focus on the basis of the other variables, we apply the multiple imputation algorithm Amelia 
(Honaker et al., 2013), create five new “completed” datasets, and re-estimate models 1 and 2. 
Table 3 shows that the number of observations (MP-months) increases by about 45 percent 
using the completed dataset. Overall, the effects remain stable compared to Models 1 and 2, 
but the effect of the local economy is now weaker than before, while the interaction with the 
government dummy remains significant. The marginal effects have been calculated based on 
Model 3 and plotted in Figure 7. As before, government MPs are expected to focus more on 
the district level as the unemployment rates increase in their constituencies while opposition 
do not change their speech focus in that case.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
We have argued that political representation can be studied dynamically by examining 
parliamentary speech records. Our analysis shows that British governing MPs are generally 
more responsive to changes is the economic, partisan and electoral context. Their district 
focus increases, as the state of the local economy decreases, or government popularity 
increases, whereas the nation/party focus increases, as the seat safety increases. In contrast, 
opposition MPs generally focus more on national and partisan issues and this focus is hardly 
affected by changes in the speeches’ context.  
 
 	   25 
Figure 7. Imputed Data: Effect of Unemployment Rate Changes  
in Parliamentary Constituencies on MPs' Parliamentary Speech Focus 
 
 
 
 These results show that politicians’ parliamentary rhetoric does hold important 
promises for the study of political representation more generally. An important aspect of 
parliamentary debates, however, is the fact that not all MPs participate equally. While the UK 
House of Commons is a case where we would expect backbenchers who wish to express 
constituency concerns to also have access to the floor, the same does not hold for systems 
where parties try to communicate a unified message (Proksch and Slapin 2012).  
 We plan to expand the analysis in a threefold manner in the future. First, we will re-
address the speaker selection problem through alternative treatment of the missing data. 
Second, we will expand the analysis to incorporate a long time period to examine whether the 
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results hold for the coalition government as well. And finally, we plan to check the robustness 
of our measure of parliamentary speech focus by using additional keywords and by 
considering the uncertainty of the measure conditional on the length of speeches delivered in 
parliament. 
   
 
References 
Benedetto, G. and Hix, S. (2007). The Rejected, the Ejected, and the Dejected: Explaining 
Government Rebels in the 2001-2005 British House of Commons. Comparative 
Political Studies, 40(7): 755-781. 
Bowler, S. (2010). Private Members’ Bills in the UK Parliament: Is There an ‘Electoral 
Connection’?. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 16(4): 476-494. 
Cain, B.E., Ferejohn, J.A., and Fiorina, M.P. (1987). The Constituency Service Basis of the 
Personal Vote for U.S. Representatives and British Members of Parliament. The 
American Political Science Review, 78(1): 110-125. 
Carey, J.M. (2007). Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in 
Legislative Voting. American Journal of Political Science, 51(1): 92-107. 
Carey, J.M. and Shugart, M.S. (1995). Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: a Rank 
Ordering of Electoral Formulas. Electoral Studies, 14(4): 417-439. 
Clark, H.D., Kornberg, A. (1992). Do National Elections Affect Perceptions of MP 
Responsiveness? A Note on the Canadian Case. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17(2): 
183-204. 
Farrell, D.M., and Scully, R. (2007). Representing Europe’s Citizens? Electoral Institutions 
and the Failure of Parliamentary Representation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 	   27 
Heitshusen, V., Young, G. and Wood, D.M. (2005). Electoral Context and MP Constituency 
Focus in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. 
American Journal of Political Science, 49(2): 32-45. 
Honaker, J., King, G., and Blackwell, M. (2013). Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data. 
Cran R-Project. 
Kam, C.J. (2009). Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kellermann, M. (2012). Estimating Ideal Points in the British House of Commons Using 
Early Day Motions. American Journal of Political Science, 56(3): 757-771. 
Lijphart, A. (1999). Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-
Six Countries. Yale: Yale University Press. 
Lowe, W., Benoit, K., Mikhaylov, S. and Laver, M. (2011). Scaling Policy Preferences from 
Coded Political Texts. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 36(1): 123-155. 
Martin, S. (2011). Using Parliamentary Questions to Measure Constituency Focus: An 
Application to the Irish Case. Political Studies, 59(2): 472-488. 
Martin, S. (2013). Is All Politics Local? The Role-orientation of Irish Parliamentarians 
towards Foreign Policy. Irish Political Studies, 28(1): 114-129. 
Norris, P. (1997). The Puzzle of Constituency Service. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 
3(2): 29-49. 
Norton, P. (1994). The Growth of the Constituency Role of the MP. Parliamentary Affairs, 
47(4): 705-720. 
Proksch, S.-O. and Slapin, J.B. (2012). Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech. 
American Journal of Political Science, 56(3): 520-537. 
Proksch, S.-O. and Slapin, J.B. (2013). Delivering the Message: Party Politics of 
Parliamentary Debate. Book Manuscript. 
 	   28 
Saalfeld, T. (2011). Parliamentary Questions as Instruments of Substantive Representation: 
Visible Minorities in the UK House of Commons, 2005-10. The Journal of Legislative 
Studies, 17(3): 271-289. 
Sandford, M. (2012). House of Commons Background Paper: Traditions and customs of the 
House. House of Commons Library, Note SN/PC/06432. 
Sieberer, U. (2006). Party Unity in Parliamentary Democracies: A Comparative Analysis. The 
Journal of Legislative Studies, 12(2): 150-178. 
Soroka, S., Penner, E. and Blidook, K. (2009). Constituency Influence in Parliament. 
Canadian Journal of Political Science, 42(3): 563.591. 
Tsebelis, G. (2002). Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. New York: Russel Sage 
Foundation. 
Vivyan, N. and Wagner, M. (2012), Do voters reward rebellion? The electoral accountability 
of MPs in Britain. European Journal of Political Research, 51(2): 235–264. 
